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I. Introduction 
This paper seeks to develop an analysis of capital accumulation in South Africa, with 
particular reference to the growth of the manufacturing sector, which is different 
from two kinds of llconventional wisdomsl' which have come to dominate the current 
literature. The first of these, basing itself on the wizardry of neo-classical 
economics, assumes a radical rupture and disjuncture between the spheres of lleconomicsll 
and "politicsll, with the harmonious and marvellous development of the former 
restricted by the continuing mischievous intervention of the latter. While the sphere 
of lteconomicsll develops in accordance with the laws of nature, laws which neither 
discriminate against nor favour any particular group, the sphere of lfpoliticslt is
characterized by fierce struggles between various interest groups, some of whom 
(usually white ~frikaners) managed in 1948 to seize hold of the levers of government 
and power in the state and used these as a means to direct the natural development of 
the lteconoqyll in their own selfish interests. (1) 
This conceptualization has recently been the subject of strong criticism by 
various writers broadly identifiable as Marxists or neo-Marxists. Some of these who 
follow the work of Poulantzas particularly closely have developed a l'conventional 
wisdom" of their own which, while parting from orthodox neo-classical theory in a 
number of critical aspects, none the less does reveal some remarkable similarities to 
that theory. For instance, as with neo-classical theory, the Poulantzians posit a 
necessary rupture between the economic and political instances (or spheres, in the neo- 
classical jargon), sometimes referred to as the "relative autonow of the instancesll. 
Of course, the Poulantzian conception of both the economic and political instances is 
radically different from that of the neo-classicists: i.e., the essential relations 
are understood as exploitative and oppressive rather than neutral and natural. 
However, despite this difference, the similarity between the two approaches reveals 
itself more blatantly in the f o m  in which the Poulantsians see the economic instance 
being developed. For, although development occurs through class struggle, since 
the unity of classes is constituted at the level of the state (i.e., at the 
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level of the political instance), it is, as with the neo-classicists, the sphere of 
the political which is the forum for the enactment of fierce struggles between the 
various classes and fractions of classes. This leads to the development of analyses 
of particular periods of South African history which bear strong resemblances to neo- 
classical interpretation: for instance, the Poulantzians argue that, as a result of 
struggles between the various fractions of capital (interest groups in the neo- 
classical jargon) in the immediate post-war period, one fraction,usually identified 
as white Afrikaners, managed to gain access to state power and used this as a means 
of determining the form of development of the economic instance in their own (selfish) 
fractional interests. (2) Although the Pmlantzian position usually includes - 
relatively sophisticated and economistic arguments about the relation between 
political parties and fractions of capital which are not to be found in the neo- 
classical literature, these two positions are nevertheless remarkably close. 
We should state quite clearly at the beginning of this paper that,while we 
disagree with both of these approaches, we none the less feel that both "schools" 
have addressed themselves to a critical and complex problem area in the analysis of 
capitalist societies, namely the problem of the conceptualization of capital 
accumulation and its relation to economics and politics. While we do not intend to 
mount a full critique of these positions here, partly because these have been entered 
into elsewhere (3), a few comments on the Poulantzian approach would not be out of 
place before we develop our own analysis. 
The essential inadequacy of the Poulantzian position lies in the failure to 
understand correctly the dynamic of capital accumulation. Although the Poulantzians 
all acknowledge the importance of class struggle to accumulation (4), their analyses 
in fact focus almost exclusively on intercapitalist disagreements (struggles, in the 
Poulantzian jargon) between fractions of capital and on struggles between fractions 
of capital and the white wage-earning petty-bourgeoisie (white workers are not defined 
as workers by the Poulantzians but as "a new petty-bourgeoisie"). (5) In so doing 
these authors root themselves firmly in the Poulantzian tradition: 
The contradictions most directly and acutely reflected 
within the state are those among the dominant classes 
and fractions and between these and the supporting 
classes, far more than the contradiction between the 
power bloc and the workiw class. The latter 
contradictions are basically expressed in the bourgeois 
state 'at a distance1 . (6) (Our emphasis) 
By concentrating the analysis on problems within the power bloc, the dynamic of 
accumulation comes to be situated, not in the relations of conflict between capital 
and labour, but in the relations of competition within capital itself. These 
competitive relations then become fGtishized, as they very often are in neo-classical 
theory, so as to become explanatory concepts for the dynamic of accumulation itself, 
thereby undermining the very basis of Marxism. Since inter-capitalist relations are 
situated in the forefront of these analyses, they become the prime movers of history - 
the motor of accumulation - while the real class struggle, defined as the struggle 
between capital and labour, gets relegated to a subordinate position in the analysis, 
i.e. it is only "expressed in the bourgeois state 'at a distanceltl. Consequently, we 
find that in an article purporting to deal with class struggle and the state in South 
Africa (7) the resistance waged against capital by black workers (and they constitute, 
for the Poulant~ians, the overwhelming majority of the South African working class, 
since white workers are part of the new petty bourgeoisie) over a twelve-year period 
(1920-1932) is analysed as follows: 
So far as the principal dominated classes were concerned 
the Pact was essentially a period of continuity. The 
state continued to intervene to secure labour for all 
the various fractions of capital, and to use its 
repressive and ideological apparatuses to prevent 
political organization by the principal dominated 
classes. The support which the ICU had given to 
national capital in its struggle for hegemony thus did 
not prevent Minister of Justice, Pirow, from conducting 
a compaign of repression against that organization 
with the full support of all fractions in the power 
bloc. 
Again, the effect of the Draconian Hertzog Bills on the African workers' struggle is 
dismissed as follows: 
As such, the segregationist policy contained in these 
measures was perfectly consistent with the continuing 
hegemony of national capital ... The segregationist 
measures in so far as they related to the maintenance 
of tribal structures, denial of rights in urban areas 
etc. were directly repressive measures designed to 
ensure continued political domination. As such they 
received the support of the whole power bloc. (8) 
These bland generalizations and descriptions are hopelessly inadequate as a basis for 
a serious Marxist analysis of class struggle, and of the state's involvement in that 
struggle, in South Africa over a twenty-year period. One cannot dismiss two decades 
of African working class resistance during a period of intense struggle and 
fundamental economic and political change simply by claiming that "the state 
continued to intervene to secure labour for all the various fractions of capital". 
We have to analyse and explain the changing forms of that intervention or else we are 
left only with abstract generalizations about the capitalist state which, while 
adding nothing to our understanding of class struggle, in fact detract from the 
possibility of a correct analysis. For the contradictions between capital and labour 
are not expressed in the bourgeois state "at a distancef1 (as the Poulantzians claim); 
on the contrary, they manifest themselves most directly in the form of the capitalist 
state. An example of the kind of incorrect analyses which arise out of the 
Poulantzian approach is to be found in the following statement: 
But, a differing approach with respect to Black Trade 
Unions became evident towa,rds the close of the period 
i. e. 1930~1. Industrial capital was beginning to 
establish a series of informal agreements with 
emergent Black Trade Unions and the government 
appeared to be considering a very limited recognition - 
an approach it abandoned when the Mines intervened to 
demand that no recognition be granted. This differing 
approach was the germ of a more serious division 
between the capitalists as is evidenced in the next 
period. (9) 
In this analysis, the black working class appears only "at a distancell and is 
seemingly passive throughout. Black Trade Unions are I1emergingl1, although the forces 
giving rise to their emergence, the level of that emergence, its implications for 
capital, etc., are all ignored. Furthermore, the "emergencen does not seem to have 
any momentum of its own or, at least, the state does not respond to that momentum in 
the slightest. Thus, in this analysis, the struggle for black unions is presented 
not as a struggle between capital and labour (which is essentially what it is) but 
as a llstrugglell between particular groups of capitals, each trying to influence the 
state to act in its own interest. The state here weighs up the arguments and 
strengths of the various contending interest groups and then acts to support the one 
against the other - i.e., it acts to promote the interests of pa.rticula.r groups of 
capitals against other groups rather than acting to secure the conditions for the 
reproduction of capital in general against labour. It is difficult to see precisely 
how the Poulantzian conceptualization of the role of the state differs from the 
pluralist model. In general terms, the state's response can be understood only in 
terms of the necessity imposed on it as a capitalist state to secure the conditions 
for the expansion of capital in general at a time of rising working-class resistance 
to oppression and exploitation. Consequently, the black working class must be active 
at the centre of the analysis, and not peripheral to the analysis, since it is their 
struggle which determines the form of capital's response through the state. Unless 
the analysis is situated in this form it cannot fail but fall victim to pluralism 
since, as soon as the working class is prevented from intervening in the centre of 
the analysis, we are left only with the differing interests and interventions of a 
plurality of groups as providing a basis for state policy. 
Finally, we would like to examine one statement by the Poulantzians which 
is particularly illustrative of some of the points made above: 
... the critical division within the capitalist class 
was that between imperialist/f oreign capital (S) on the 
one hand and national capital(s) on the other. The 
conflict between these fractions evolved around the 
desired trajectory of capitalist development Y 
crudely, whether South Africa was to remain an economic 
chattel of imperialism or to generate its own national 
capitalist development. Yet, of course, national 
capital remained capitalist. [we are unsure of the 
precise purpose of this sentence: D.I. & M.P.] Its 
anti-imperialism did not end the contradictions between 
it and the classes it exploited. On the contrary, the 
anti-imperialist policies of national capital in South 
Africa were made possible by raising the rate of 
exploitation of the proletariat, and by opp'ressing it 
yet further. (10) 
While we are fully in agreement with the argument expressed in the final sentence, 
what we cannot understand is, if the Poulantzians agree that anti-imperialist 
policies are made possible only through an intensification of proletarian 
exploitation and oppression, why are the forms of these intensifications, and the 
resistance to them, not the central focus of their analysis. If no anti-imperialist 
strategy was possible without the intensification of the struggle of capital against 
labour, surely one cannot hope to explain the development of the state strategy (its 
twists, turns, advances m d  set-backs) without analysing it as a manifestation of 
the new forms of class struggle - i.e., without situating it directly in the struggle 
between capital and labour. This is of course not to argue that particular capitals 
or particular groups of capitals seek the same solutions - there are, of course, 
differences within capital. But these differences do not evolve around desired 
trajectories of capitalist development abstracted from the conditions of class 
struggle. Nor does the state weigh up the various solutions of various llfractionsw 
and impose one or other, depending on which "fraction" is hegemonic at a particular 
moment. The state is the political form of the domination of capital in general over 
labour and seeks to impose this domination (and not the whims of particular capitals) 
on labour. The extent to which it can do so - i.e., the extent to which it can wage 
a successful struggle against labour - determines the trajectory of capitalist 
development. Its failure to do so results in the destruction of capitalism. 
The Roots of Industry in South Africa 
The transition to capitalism in Europe had far-reaching consequences even 
for those areas, like southern Africa, which were geographically far removed from the 
centres of capitalist production. The expansion of mercantile capital during the 
16th, 17th and 18th centuries led to the colonization of the Cape and the gradual 
extension of capitalist market relations to the region. By the 19th century 
capitalist relations, operating throu& the market, had been extended througkout much 
of southern Africa, altho* it was almost solely along the coastal region that the 
immediate process of production was organized along capitalist lines. However, the 
demands engendered on international capitalism for new sources of gold led to the 
large-scale intrusion of capital into immediate mineral production in South Africa 
(especially gold, diamonds and coal) and to the further extension of capitalist 
relations of production in the region. This extension was, however, by no means 
smooth and manifested itself in the form of continuous crises in the social relations 
and in the restructuring of these relations. Particularly important in this regard 
were the wars of conquest waged by capital against the African communities in the 
1870s and 1880s and against the independent Boer republics, which secured the final 
dominance of capitalist social relations in the region and laid the basis for the 
formation of a unitary capitalist state in South Africa. The intense struggles in 
early accumulation in South Africa thus manifested themselves economically in the 
form of the developmen-k of capitalist industry centred around mining, and politically 
in the form of the segregationist state (1910). 
During the 20th century (prior to World War 11), the form of South Africa's 
incorporation into the system of international capitalism - i.e., its role as a major 
exporter of minerals (particularly gold) - stimulated the development of other 
sectors of the economy and the transformation of the relations of production in these 
sectors: following the expansion of the local market, capitalist agriculture was 
transformed, secondary industry developed, commerce, trade and finance expanded 
together with infrastructure (roads, rail, telecommunications, electricity, etc. ) . 
The mines provided both a direct market for many of the products of secondary 
industry (e.g., explosives, boots, steel, cement and candles) and also indirectly led 
to the establishment of a wider market for other li&t industry goods like clothes, 
textiles, brick, tiles, bakeries, soap, etc. The expansion of these markets led, on 
the one hand, to the transformation, especially in the coastal areas, of existing 
small-scale craft industries into capitalist enterprises and to the destruction of 
artisanal craft production in the African areas, and, on the other hand, to the influx 
of some foreign capital to establish plants to supply the local markets. These 
developed in these early years under the modest protection of the state. In 1906 the 
state introduced protection for, inter alia, the following local commodities: boots 
and shoes, biscuits, confectionery, sugar, soap, blankets and rugs, printing,and 
hamess and saddlery. (11) In l910 the Cullinan Commission, which was appointed to 
investigate the possibilities of developing local industries, recommended further 
protection, which was implemented by the state in 1914 (the Union Customs Tariff Act, 
No. 26 of 1914). Yet, despite these developments, the secondary industrial sector 
remained relatively insignificant, contributing only 7% to the National Income in 
1911-1912, and the local economy remained primarily dependent on mining, contributing 
28h, and to a lesser extent agriculture, contributing 16%. (12) Over the next few 
decades, however, the structure of production in the economy was to undergo a 
substantial transformation. By 1942-43, secondary industry was making the largest 
contribution to the National Income (lgOh), followed by mining (17%) and agriculture 
(13%). What, then, were the forces which brought about this transformation? 
It was essentially the period of conquest in the latter part of the 19th 
century which secured the conditions under which an African migrant labour force 
emerged on a sufficiently large scale to feed the requirements of capitalist production 
in South Africa. This labour force came to be regulated and controlled by the 
segregationist form of the state in South Africa throw a complex set of regulations 
and lam (e.g., the administrative measures of 1903 and 1909, the Native Labour 
Regulation Act of 1913, and the Administration of Persons to the Union Regulation Act 
of 1913) which together with other legislation (such as the Land Act of 1913) 
perpetuated the smooth flow of black labour to the centres of capitalist production. (13) 
The expansion of all forms of capitalist production during the second decade of the 
20th century, p&icularly though the "War Effortf1, intensified capital's requirements 
for labour, enabling black workers to capitalize on the increased power which the 
shortage conferred on them. Serious strikes by African workers (inter alia, by African 
mine workers, dockers and municipal workers) (14) occurred over this period, and in 
1919 the first large-scale combination of African workers, the ICU, was formed. At 
the same time, white workers, whose monopoly over skills and whose organization in 
unions put them in a somewhat different position in relation to capital, intensified 
the struggle against capital (the major strikes of 1907, 1909, 1911, 1913 and 1914), 
forcing the state to restructure industrial relations with regard to white workers. (15) 
Thus we find that, by the end of the second decade, production had expanded 
considerably in South Africa; in particular, secondary industry had benefited from the 
decline in imports of manufactured goods during the war, so that by the end of the war  
the nucleus of a secondary industrial structure had been formed, whose main pillars 
were electricity, steel, chemicals and fertilizer, engineering (mainly maintenance and 
repair work), construction materials, clothing, and the processing of agricultural 
goods. (BY 1917-18, second-ary industry was contributing 100h of the National Income 
and employing 124,000 workers, 78,000 of whom were Africans. ) (16) However, 
internationally, capital in general emerged from this period weakened by the ravages 
of a World War and a depression and faced with the world's first socialist revolution, 
while, locally, there was intensification of workingLclass struggle and the 
development for the first time of serious white unemployment as the relations of 
production in agriculture continued to be transformed. 
 o or instance, following the 
recession of 1916, whose immediate cause was a severe h u t ,  large numbers of white 
llbywonersll were left in a state of vdestitutionlv.) (17) 
Faced with this crisis, capital was forced to initiate a process of 
restructuring which would again force the working; class on to the defensive. The 
basis of capital's assault against the working class was to seek to develop the 
divisions which had already been established between European and African workers , 
through restructuring the relations of exploitation a.nd oppression in South Africa. 
The inteme struggles of the '20s arose out of working-class resistance to this 
strategy. For the first few years of the t20s, capital sought to expand production in 
all sectors of the economy, to this end the Far East Rand gold fields were 
developed, base metal and coal mining were expanded, infrastructure was further 
developed with the establishment of ESCOM in 1921, while the Board of Trade and 
Industries was founded in 1921 to redraft the Customs and Excise Tarfffs and "to 
advise the government in respect of assisting and developing industries in the Union". 
(~etween 1921 and 1924 Tariff protection m s  extended to 16 further industries.) (18) 
Yet these changes were neither fast enough nor sufficient to stem the tide 
of rising militancy among the working class. While, on the one hand, the influence 
of the ICU was extended among black workers, on the other hand white unemployment 
continued to rise, exacerbated by mining capitalists who, in attempting to 
revolutionize the labour process, sought to expel large numbers of white workers from 
employment, thereby provoking the 1922 Rand Revolt of white workers. (19) The state 
was forced, initially, to repress the revolt with brute force, and then to intensify 
the policy it had begun earlier by (i) interceding more forcefully in the economy to 
secure the necessaqy expansion of production, (ii) exercishig a tiater dsicipline 
over particular capitalists so as to safeguard the reproduction of capital in general, 
and (iii) ensuring the emasculation of both sectors of the working class (but 
particularly, in the mid-f 20s, the white workers). The Pact Government, which came to 
power in 1924 in the course of the restructuring of these relations, was the major 
agent of capital in this regard. 
By the latter part of the 920s the state had made important advances in this 
struggle. Regarding its more forceful intervention in stimulating economic development, 
by 1925 it had passed the Customs Tariff and Excise Duty Amendment Act, which provided 
important new forms of protection for industry; by 1928, it had created the steel 
giant ISCOR, which was to become the focal point for future expansion in secondary 
industry; and it had introduced other reforms to facilitate the development of other 
sectors of the economy through taxation measures, railway tariffs, etc. Regarding the 
exercise of a tighter discipline over particular capitalists, the Government had 
passed the Job Reservation Act which regulated employment practices in the mining 
industry and secured the protection of certain categories of jobs held by white mine 
workers, thereby ensuring that the problem of white unemployment would not be 
exacerbated by particular mining capitalists seeking to extend the pmctice of 
substituting cheap black labour for white labour. Furthermore, state bodies were 
established to regulate employment practices in manufacturing industry, especially 
as they related to wage rates, conditions of work and the division of jobs along 
racial lines. By the latter part of the 120s, then, the state had succeeded in its 
original broad aim of dividing the working class: organized white workers had been 
neutralized, while black workers, loosely organized under the banner of the ICU, had 
been further isolated from them. The state then mounted a vicious attack on black 
workers, which culminated in 1929 in the campaign of terror spearheaded by the 
Minister of Justice, 0. Pirow. which led to the demise of the ICU and to the 
temporary defeat of- the ANC. -These measures succeeded in securing for capital h. 
general a higher rate of exploitation of all sections of labour, thereby promotiq 
accumulation in South Africa. 
The restructuring of the capital relation which had been carried throu& 
during the 820s thus enabled capital to inflict an important defeat on the milit.ant 
leadership of the working class - a defeat which was intensified during the depression. 
It was on the basis of this defeat that capital was able to enter the "golden period1' 
of accumulation during the '30s - a period in which, while capital expanded, the 
leadership of the working class struggled to develop a strategy to cope with the new 
conditions of class struggle (e.g. the confusion of the South African Communist Party; 
inaction of the ANC; the gradual development of industrial unions among black workers 
at this time). The economic development, rwd particularly the development of industry, 
which occurred during the decade enabled capital to resolve the llpoor white problem1' - 
i.e., the problem of European unemployment - by introducing the llcivilized labour 
policyg1, while the enactment of further repressive legislation (e.g., the 1936 Native 
Land and Trust Act, the 1937 Immigration Act, amendments to the Pass Laws and the 
Urban Areas Act) intensified the forms of control over black workers, thereby 
resolving "the native problemll for the immediate present. (20) 
Although it was the manufacturing sector which expanded faster than any 
other sector during the '30s - by 1939 its contribution to the GDP (l@$) was almost 
as great as that of mining and quarrying (21%) (agriculture 13%) (21) - the gold 
mining industry remained the focal point of economic expansion. In particular, the 
increase in the price of gold, which began after South Africa left the gold standard 
ip 1932 and continued during the rest of the decade (22), provided an important 
stimulation to the general expansion. Firstly, because as a result of the increased 
foreign exchang;e earned from gold sales (23), South Africa's capacity to import 
capital goods which were necessary for the expansion of manufacturing industry was 
expanded and the balance of pa~~ments constraint eased considerably. Secondly, the 
higher profit levels (24) enabled the mining industry to expand mineral production to 
a significant extent, particularly through the development of the Far West Rand gold 
field. And, thirdly, it enabled the state to increase the level of taxation on the 
industry without undemining mineral production, especially through the Excess 
Profits Tax which increased mine taxes by almost 2500'j between 1933 and 1934 (25), so 
as to pump finance into the development of infrastructure (in particular through 
ESCOM and SAR & H) and into support for agriculture (especially through the Land Bank 
and subsidized prices) and manufacturing industry. In addition to the expansion of 
ISCOR in 1940, the state established the Industrial Development Corporation as a 
"financial institution specializing in industrial finance, namely, in the systematic 
and thorou#~ investigation of new propositions and the underwriting and selling of 
securities". (26) 
At the same time, the level of both foreign investment and mining investment 
in manufacturing increased significantly. Foreign involvement was mainly through 
"large overseas concerns [which] increasingly established branch factoriest1 inside 
South Africa as a means of gaining access to the expanding local market without running 
up against the protective tariffs. (27) (NO doubt cheap labour-power and cheap steel 
also influenced their decision. ) Prominent among these companies were Nestles, 
Cadburys , Ford, General Motors, McKinnon Chain (US), Dunlop, Firestone, Siemans , 
Babcock and Wilcox, Dorman Long, Stewarts and Lloyds, Davy Ashmore, and General 
Electric. (28) In addition, other foreign multinationals already established in South 
Africa, like ICI and Lever Brothers, expanded their local plant (for instance, AE and 
CI, whose parent concerns were ICI and Anglo-American, began producing fertilizers). 
The South African state also drew extensively on British loans over this period. (29) 
Mining capital also began at this time to take "a considerable interest in manufacturing 
undertakingsll (30), altho- there is some debate as to the precise nature of these. 
Some sources, such as the Board of Trade, have argued that this interest "manifested 
itself mainly in the form of finding lucrative investments in existing factories rather 
than in establishing and nursing new industriest1 (31), while others have argued that 
llmining houses have recently been responsible for the flotation of several large 
industrial concernsl1. (32) Among the more important mining investments at this time 
were Anglo-Americanls involvement in fertilizers and in engineering equipment, 
particularly the manufacture of mining equipment and hi&-speed drills; Union 
Corporationls involvement in SAPPI (pulp and paper milling) ; and Anglo-Transvaall S 
involvement in engineering, glass, cement and fishing. 
Thus, by the end of the decade, the South African economy had undergone 
substantial transformations. In particular, the manufacturing sector, which now 
employed 236,000 workers (of whom 93,000 were white), had developed as an important 
component of the economy. As we have argued above, these developments, which benefited 
all the various groupings of capital ("national1', llforeignll, mining, etc. ), were made 
possible only by the defeat suffered by the South African working class during the 
t20s and early '30s. However, the economic growth achieved during this period was not 
without its contradictions: in particular, the rapid growth produced acute labour 
shortages which, coupled with the continued impoverishment of the reserves, encouraged 
black workers to press for wage increases and to organize themselves into industrial 
unions. It was the unleashing of these forces of resistance among black workers, in 
particular in the immediate post-war period, which posed the major threat to capital 
at that time - a threat which capital could overcome only by a further fundamental 
restructuring of the relations of exploitation and oppression in South Africa. 
111. Conclusion 
~ 
It will be clear that the above aaalysis differs in a number of important 
respects from that offered by the Poulantzians. By minimizing the importance of class 
struggle and by overemphasizing the importance of inter-capitalist disagreements, the 
Poulantzians have failed to understand the real nature of the conflicts of the '20s. 
This failure manifests itself both in their understanding of the nature of working- 
class struggle at this time and of capital's relation to the working class. They have 
argued that in 1924 llnational capital ... seized hegemony from mining capital, the 
principal fraction of international or imperialist capital, which exercised hegemony 
before that dateff. (33) lfNational capitalt1, at this stage, consisted of "capitalist 
agriculture and industrial a@iculturel1. (34) According to this argument, however, 
ffNational capital alone was not strong enough to displace miningff (35) and it was only 
"in alliance with a fraction of the new petty bourgeoisie and supported by strata of 
the white asld black wage earning classes [that] national capital achieved hegemony in 
1924". (36) For the Poulantzians, then, white lfwage earnersf1 became a part of the 
alliance with national capital against black workers and mining capital. But does 
- - 
this alliance work in their lfinterestsff? Not at all, for we learn that "the state 
under the hegemony of national capital proved to be a firm defender of the conditions 
necessary for capitalist production in the mines - often, as we shall see, winst 
the interests of the new petty bourgeois allied classf'. (37) In fact, so much so that 
average wage rates for white miners and white industrial workers in 1932 were still 
lower-than-they had been in 1922, while job reservation on the mines was only applied 
to those jobs which mining capital was not at that time planning to transfer to 
Africans. (38) But, since the Pact government continued to reproduce the exploitative 
relations established by capital in 1922, what grounds are there for claiming that the 
Pact government was the political manifestation of an alliance between national capital 
and white wage-earners? 
The answer is given thus: llHowever, there was one form of state intervention 
which did result in fairly substantial concessions for white proletarians. That was 
the statets intervention to secure employment for the previously unemployed, unskilled 
poor whites." (39) In the following sentence, however, we are told, quite correctly, 
that: llThe reason for this intervention was that unemployed poor whites, concentrated 
as they were in the cities suld towns, were considered by all fractions of the dominant 
classes to constitute a threat to the stability of the social formation ... In 
intervening to solve this problem the state was essentially serving the common I 
interests of the power bloc. In fact it was doing little more than enlarging and 
extending policies which the state had pursued under the hegemony of imperialist l 
capital.11 (40) But if this is so, if the state is acting (as it clearly is) in the 
common interests of ca~ital. how then can the Poulantzians arme that it is also actiw 
- 
in the interests of white W&-earners? Unless they assume that there is no 
contradiction between the interests of capital and labour. It is precisely because the 
Poulantzians recognize this conflict between Marxist theow and the analysis which they 
actually present that they introduce the notion of white workers being a part of the 
Ifnew petty bourgeoisiel1 rather than the working class. For it is only by severing 
white workers from their class that the Poulantzians are able to maintain the - 
contradiction between capital and labour. But in so doing they reproduce the 
ideology of capital - an ideology which seeks to deny the fundamental contradiction 
between all sections of capital, on the one hand, and all sections of labour, on the 
other. (1n fact, the contradiction which the Poulantzians arrive at has agricultural 
capital, industrial capital and white workers allied against mining capital and 
international capital.) Furthermore, with specific reference to the crises of the 
920s in South Africa, their analysis further obscures the fact that the attack mounted 
by capital was directed against% sections of the working class, and that the defeat 
suffered resulted in the hi&er exploitation of all sections of the work in^ class 
(though there were clearly differences in the forms of exploitation experienced by 
white, coloured, Indian and African workers). 
Finally, we find that the Poulantzian obsession with seeking out 
"contradictions" whenever possible leads them to misunderstand the real unity of 
capital in South Africa. For instance, the Poulantzians have argued that: "In short 
it can be seen that the Protective policies of the Pact period depended upon the 
outcome of the struggle between the major fractions in the power bloc." (41) In our 
earlier analysis we tried to show that the policy of Protection cannot be situated 
outside of the overall attempt by capital to restructure the oapital relation2 
response to the rising militancy of the working class as a whole. Certainly, 
particular capitalists (and the Chamber of Mines as representative of a specific 
group of particular capitals) objected to this policy, but we have to differentiate 
clearly between the overall requirements of capital in general (to secure the condition 
for the reproduction of capitalist relations) and the limited concerns of particular 
capitalists (to increase their own immediate profits). What is important is that we 
do not interpret state policy as being simply a reflection of the interests of one 
group of particular capitals which is against the interests of another: state policy 
must be understood as a manifestation of the fundamental unity of capital (understood 
as being in constant contradiction with labour) over and above the limited concerns of 
particular capitalists or groups of capitalists. Once this is grasped, we can then 
understand the real relation between state policy and capital accumulation at any 
particular moment. We can understand, for example, that, although a policy of 
Protection certainly would have increased the cost structure of- industries in 
South Africa and would also have served to deprive certain foreign industrialists of 
markets for their commodities, the expansion of capitalist production in South Africa, 
and particularly industrial capital, served to strengthen capital in general against 
labour in South Africa and also served to strengthen capital in general in Britain 
(since the fundamental requirement of British capital at that time was to promote the 
export of capital goods). (42) There is thus a fundamental unity between the 
reproduction of capitalism in Britain and in South Africa which the respective states 
in these countries seek to secure, even thaw in any process of restructuring certain 
particular capitalists in both countries are ftsacrificed" to the altar of accumulation 
in general. It is only if we understand and emphasize that unity (rather than the 
areas of disagreement raised by particular groups) that we can explain the closer 
participation of "foreign" and "national" capitalist groups in the enhanced expansion 
of capital in South Africa in the lthirties. 
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